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Facts, Feasts, and Forests: Considering 
Truth and Reconciliation in Tanah Papua
Todd Biderman and Jenny Munro
In this chapter we are interested in what sorts of “truths” are included in 
“truth and reconciliation” and from whose perspective. We also consider 
what sorts of reconciliation are already taking place in Tanah Papua, even 
amid ongoing violence. In Tanah Papua we have the problem of a multi-di-
mensional conflict and a state that is very dedicated to controlling what is 
said about that conflict. It is worth considering how “non-truth” plays out 
in local reconciliation attempts and who or what institutions are defended 
or marginalized in this dynamic. 
Tanah Papua has been the site of low-level, endemic conflict since the 
1960s. Despite Indonesia’s efforts to eradicate Papuan nationalism, Indig-
enous aspirations for independence have persisted. The Free Papua Move-
ment (Organisasi Papua Merdeka or OPM), a network of poorly armed 
fighters based in remote areas that has staged sporadic attacks on Indone-
sian forces, has gained much attention from Indonesian authorities. How-
ever, the OPM is only one of many groups that criticize Indonesian rule 
and draw attention to social injustices and human rights abuses. The vast 
majority of Papuans do not participate in any OPM-related activities and 
most are not in favour of violence as a means of achieving independence. 
More recently, organizations such as the West Papua National Committee 
(Komite Nasional Papua Barat, or KNPB) have put forth a vocal critique of 
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Indonesian abuses, while the United Liberation Movement for West Papua 
(ULMWP) seeks to bring attention to political conditions in Papua on an 
international stage. 
Politics in Tanah Papua is not reducible to the historical context by 
which Indonesia came to govern. Rather, Papuans critique the social, eco-
nomic, environmental, and political conditions that have emerged under 
Indonesian rule. The Indonesian state, especially the police and military 
in Papua, has been intolerant of such criticisms. Criticism of Indonesian 
governance is branded as “treason,” suppressed through violence, murder, 
and intimidation, and often punished through arbitrary detention and im-
prisonment. There is denial about the actions of the military and police in 
Papua at the highest levels of Indonesian governance, and human rights vi-
olations have not been addressed. Indeed, truth, denial, secrets, and impu-
nity are at the heart of the political conflict in Papua. Indonesian non-truth 
is central to Papuan experiences and grievances. Yet scholars have argued 
that non-truth is exceedingly common in approaches to conflict resolution 
throughout Indonesia, including in Papua, and even for community ac-
tors drawing on local understandings.1 Still, for Papua, one question that 
arises is how non-truth as an approach is valued or enforced in response to 
incidents of state violence, even as Papuans and their supporters continue 
to criticize non-truth as a broad political practice of the Indonesian state 
because it denies history, rights, and current conditions. 
In looking at the concept and practice of truth and reconciliation in 
Papua, we first acknowledge that Papuans and their supporters have been 
doing work that reflects the principles of truth and reconciliation in spite 
of ongoing conflict. Their work, as we discuss later, is mainly of local in-
spiration and derivation, but also reflects international connections and 
experiences. 
Papua’s diversity provokes questions about how international, nation-
al, or otherwise high-level processes can engage appropriately with local 
voices, world views, and cultural values. What, then, are Papuan approach-
es to reconciliation, and what is the role of truth? Because conflict is ongo-
ing, the Papuan case also gives us an opportunity to ask what has to take 
place, or what conditions have to be created, in order for reconciliation to 
occur and so that truth may be spoken. 
There are three aspects to highlight about approaches to truth and 
reconciliation in Papua. The first aspect is the present landscape and state 
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of Papuan approaches to conflict resolution. The second aspect, extending 
from that, questions what needs to be resolved and why. One area we high-
light is the impact of economic development projects, namely resource 
extraction and land exploitation, on Papuan identity. Thirdly, given these 
points, and exploring some recent examples of small-scale reconciliation 
in the wake of state violence, we ask what truth and reconciliation process-
es in Papua might look like. 
In this chapter we make use of secondary sources on the conflict and 
resolution-related actions, present some views from people we have worked 
with in Papua, and generally draw on over a decade of experience working 
with Papuans. Truth and reconciliation is a topic we have come to by way 
of a keen interest in inequalities in Tanah Papua and a commitment to 
community-based and Indigenous-led efforts to ameliorate inequalities. 
Todd Biderman comes from a development and social- and ecological-jus-
tice background, largely in Indonesia. Over the last eight years he has been 
working with Papuan civil-society groups and communities. Jenny Munro 
is an anthropologist who works on gender, health, and education in Pap-
ua, particularly in the central highlands of Papua province. We have also 
collaborated on developing an Indigenous-led HIV prevention strategy for 
Tanah Papua.2
Understandings of the Conflict in Tanah Papua
Before we can discuss what approaches have been taken towards resolving 
the political conflict in Papua, it is important to note that there is disagree-
ment about the nature of the conflict itself, and therefore what needs to be 
resolved, by whom, and why. This situation partially underpins Papuans 
calls for truth, or “straightening history” (pelurusan sejarah), described in 
more detail later. In general, there are dominant Indonesian and dominant 
Papuan perspectives on the conflict. The Indonesian perspective is mainly 
represented and put forward by government officials and some commen-
tators. The Papuan perspective includes Papuan scholars, some political 
leaders and representatives, and everyday Papuans. There is also diversity 
within Indonesian and Papuan views.
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Indonesian Views
The dominant, official perspective in Indonesia is that there should be no 
question about the legitimacy of Indonesia’s hold on Papua. In this view, 
Papua never should have been retained by the Dutch in the first place, as 
the Netherlands was obliged to return the entire former East Indies colony 
to the new independent government of Indonesia. From this point of view, 
Papua is critical part of a complete Indonesian nation, and indeed bringing 
Papua into its fold was an important emphasis of early Indonesian actions. 
Thus, one analysis of Papuan desires for independence suggests that the 
Indonesian agenda of generating a feeling of national belonging and com-
mon identity has failed. A less sympathetic view holds that “radicals” (the 
OPM and other groups that have been branded as terrorist organizations), 
who are presumed to represent a violent minority of Papuans, refuse to 
accept Indonesian authority, actively wage war on the state in order to 
achieve independence, and need to be eradicated through violent means. 
Related to this, another dominant, official Indonesian viewpoint on 
the conflict holds that Papuans are aggrieved by conditions of underdevel-
opment and poverty. Not being part of the Indonesian national trajecto-
ry of economic growth and increased prosperity is in some ways another 
manifestation of exclusion. But more generally, this perspective suggests 
that the source of Papuan grievance is mainly economic. Papuans are 
also said to be envious of the economic achievements and dominance of 
Indonesian migrants. Thus, there is a social dimension to this economic 
understanding of the conflict. In this view, Papua is often said to be rich 
in natural resources that have not yet been exploited to advance the social 
and economic conditions of the Indigenous inhabitants.
Researchers have also described how some Indonesians hold related, 
but unofficial views of Papua as a land of riches to be exploited, a frontier 
economy where profits can be made quickly and easily. These perspectives 
were present twenty years ago,3 and are probably even more prevalent 
today. Slama and Munro for example, describe conversations with Indo-
nesian businessmen in Jakarta who were eager to gain access to lucrative 
development, construction and other sorts of proyek (project) in Papua.4 
These ambitions suggest Indonesian (and other) entrepreneurs, managing 
agencies, and contractors are angling to capture some of the trillions of 
rupiah that make up decentralization funds in Papua.
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Papuan Views
Dominant Papuan views of the conflict tend to diverge from Indonesian 
understandings, though certain understandings are shared with progres-
sive actors and agencies in Indonesian society. From a historical perspec-
tive, Papuans find Indonesian control illegitimate, noting that their leaders 
declared independence in 1961, and that their right to self-determination 
was obliterated in the sham referendum of 1969. 
Where the Indonesian view holds that Papuans ought to feel a sense of 
belonging in a diverse nation, some Papuans argue that their cultural and 
ethnic distinctiveness from the rest of Indonesia undermine Indonesia’s 
right to govern. Related to this, Papuans have also increasingly been draw-
ing attention to experiences of stigmatization, racism, and discrimination 
that challenge those who claim that Papuans are valued as equal cultural 
citizens. Papuan critiques also draw attention to the in-migration of In-
donesians and other practices related to “Indonesianization” as proof that 
notions of national belonging are little more than political rhetoric.5 
There is a perception that Indonesian claims of nationalistic feelings 
or the desire to develop Papua are false claims that cover up true inten-
tions. For example, a key element of Papuan understandings of the conflict 
is that Indonesia wanted Papua in order to develop and profit from newly 
discovered gold deposits.6 Many Papuans suggest that Indonesia is not in-
terested in improving Papuan lives and would rather Papuans were elim-
inated to make access to resources easier. State violence, neglect of health 
and welfare issues, including a burgeoning HIV epidemic, the in-migra-
tion of Indonesians (particularly Muslim Indonesians) that has reduced 
Papuans to a minority in cities, and the birth control agenda are held up 
as examples of how Papuans lives are not valued. Leslie Butt has analyzed 
what might be called a “conspiracy theory” among Indigenous highland-
ers that argues that Indonesia has deliberately introduced HIV-infected 
sex workers to decimate the Indigenous population.7 Through her research 
she demonstrates that the term conspiracy theory is misleading because 
highlanders have good reason to question what they are told by Indone-
sians about HIV based on observations and rational assessments. For ex-
ample, sex work is illegal, and yet highlanders can see that it occurs with 
the acknowledgement of government authorities and the involvement of 
military protection. 
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Understandings of the conflict also draw attention to local situations. 
In the highlands, for example, Indigenous leaders frequently lament the 
chaos in the Indonesian system, and that their previous strategies for 
leadership, land issues, and social and economic needs are in disarray.8 
The Indonesian system has normalized corruption, the role of money in 
politics, and poor governance, and this continues to permeate local gov-
ernance. Thus locals also express frustration that members of parliament 
fail to represent their constituents’ interests and that democratic processes 
are allowed to be openly flaunted. This leads to a deepening of resentment 
towards Indonesian rule and Indonesian migrants, as well as tensions 
among Papuans. 
State Approaches to Conflict Resolution
Generally speaking, Indonesian governments have taken two approach-
es: those of “security” and “development.” The security-led approach was 
based on the idea that the conflict is being generated by particular armed 
groups, and is being inflamed by those who report on human rights abuses 
and other forms of repression. Indonesia usually claims that these reports 
are false and are just being made to increase support for Papuan indepen-
dence, both among locals and among foreign audiences. Foreigners are of-
ten accused of “false reporting,” supporting banned groups, and otherwise 
promoting separatism. This has been the justification for both the earlier 
designation of Papua as a “military operations zone” (daerah operasi mi-
liter), which restricted access, and the persistent reluctance to allow access 
to both domestic journalists and observers and foreigners. The ostensible 
need to control these activities has been the justification for continuing to 
increase the presence of the military, police, and special forces. 
Yet, as noted above, an increased military presence often means more 
restricted democratic social and political spaces, including restrictions on 
people’s right to protest and communities’ right to organize. This not only 
incites feelings of injustice among Papuans but for Indonesia it also neces-
sitates the further surveillance on Papuans and the deepening involvement 
of security agents in policing everyday life as well as community, NGO, 
and other civil-society activities. Repression of civil-society expression and 
activism has also resulted in repeated abuses of human rights. The securi-
ty approach to conflict resolution thus generates increased and deepening 
21115 | Facts, Feasts, and Forests
conflict. This has long been recognized by Papuans and others, leading to 
calls for peacebuilding, dialogue, and political solutions. Despite acknowl-
edging that Papuan grievances might amount to more than just a few so-
called terrorists who disagree with the historical conditions of incorpora-
tion, the Indonesian government continues to allow security forces to play 
a dominant role in managing conflict in Papua. 
The security approach has been coupled with the “development” 
(pembangunan) or “prosperity” (kesejahteraan) approach to conflict res-
olution, which is derived from an understanding that conditions of un-
derdevelopment, poverty, and lack of economic development contribute 
to Papuan desires for independence. However, the Indonesian state has a 
particular view on what sort of development is lacking in Papua, and what 
is therefore needed to improve “prosperity.” No doubt there are differing 
opinions within this approach to conflict resolution, with some focusing 
more on Papuans’ poverty, economic inequalities with Indonesians, and 
lack of services, while many others take the need for development to mean 
investment into Papua through capital projects, often funded by foreign 
aid. The Special Autonomy Law of 2001 reflected the view that profits 
from Papuan resources had been flowing to Jakarta with very little be-
ing retained in the way of development returns or outcomes. The central 
government thus saw the problem as one of unequal development, not of 
self-determination. It mandated transfer payments, through which bil-
lions of dollars have been poured into projects to improve governance, 
infrastructure, health, and education. 
Special autonomy had some input from Papuan representatives, but 
at the time most Papuans saw it as an unwelcome alternative to indepen-
dence, and many were opposed to it from the start: it was seen as Jakarta’s 
solution, not theirs. There is very little evidence of how much money has 
remained in Papua and how much has flowed back out again to Indo-
nesian contractors tasked with delivering development (especially infra-
structure) projects.9 Some critiques centre on the fact that the funds have 
contributed to the growth of a Papuan political elite, and have not been 
used to benefit Papuans more generally.10 However, Papuan leaders have 
also criticized the implementation of special autonomy, declared it de-
ceased, rejected it, and symbolically “returned” it to Jakarta. For example, 
in 2010 protesters carried a banner that said, “Special Autonomy (Otsus) 
has failed; Papuan peoples’ right to life is threatened.”11 More recently, in 
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March 2016, the Civil Servants Association of Papua declared its support 
for “the Governor and Vice-Governor of Papua to return Special Autono-
my to the central government.”12
Beyond financial transfers, special autonomy was supposed to guar-
antee Papuan leaders some authority to increase the numbers of Papuans 
in government and to empower Papuans more generally. Richard Chau-
vel among others notes that Papuan policy efforts have been hampered 
by power dynamics in Jakarta.13 Anecdotally, the presence of Papuans in 
government has increased, but there is no research to specify how and 
where this has occurred, and what effects it has had in terms of authority 
or decision-making power. 
Along with special autonomy provisions there has been a decentraliza-
tion program that aims to bring development outcomes for communities 
(in part through direct village development funds) and facilitate better 
access to government services. A new province, West Papua, was carved 
from the western tip or Bird’s Head region of Papua province. Within that, 
further devolution has occurred through the creation of new regencies (ka-
bupaten) and districts. In West Papua province prior to 2003 there were six 
regencies and now there are fourteen, with more on the way. Within that, 
there are districts that are also subdivided. The official logic behind the 
creation of new regencies and districts is that it brings services closer to 
people and makes large or rugged areas more manageable from a logistical 
and governance standpoint, but at the same time the division of these areas 
results in the fracturing of communities and cultural groups. Competitive 
angling among Indigenous people (mainly men) for funds and political 
power has led to new violence and marginalization. It has also fed into 
the narratives of those commentators who wish to blame Papuans for the 
failures of governance in the era of special autonomy. 
In some ways, the development approach to conflict resolution in Pap-
ua also brings increased securitization, building on a tradition of military 
involvement (official or clandestine) in development. For the thirty years 
of Suharto’s rule Indonesia was run by a military-backed dictatorship, with 
police and military tasked with implementing development. In Papua, the 
security sector continues to be heavily involved, both legally and illegal-
ly, in corporate activities, especially resource extraction and development 
projects in remote areas. President Joko Widodo (known as Jokowi) has 
expanded the role of the military as a development actor in Papua,14 and 
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signed off on far-reaching security policies that take the military into more 
regions of Papua/West Papua, in greater numbers, with permanent bases, 
and with less oversight from Jakarta15—exactly the opposite of what most 
analysts say is needed to overcome abuses of power. Jokowi also failed to 
address an incident that occurred in Papua mere weeks after he took his 
oath, when unarmed school students were reportedly shot by police in the 
highlands during a protest against military abuses.16
A controversial effect of decentralization and the creation of new dis-
tricts is that these processes result in an influx of soldiers filling new com-
mand posts and bases at each level of administration.17 Increased military 
and increased money is a dangerous combination that has historically led 
to conflict and rights abuses in Papua. At the same time, there is a lack 
of recognition of historical violence, ongoing violence, and heavy-handed 
support of that development program. 
After years of Indonesia’s “security” and “prosperity” approaches, the 
land of Papua still ranks among the poorest regions of Indonesia and is the 
least developed according to the UN Human Development Index. At the 
same time, there is a continued closure of democratic and civil-political 
space. There are, within the five-decade history of this conflict, obvious 
and well-documented cases of killings, rape, torture, of political disap-
pearances, of gross violations against segments of Papuan society. 18 These 
are the obvious issues that will come to the fore of any truth and reconcil-
iation process—if we get that far. 
Papuan-led Strategies towards Dialogue, 
Acknowledgement, Truth, and Dispute Resolution
Papuan leaders have made initial steps to meet the Indonesian govern-
ment on at least three occasions since 1998—the year of the fall of the 
Suharto dictatorship—to try and bridge the gap between independence 
claims and the Indonesian government. West Papuan leader Octovianus 
Mote describes 1999 and 2000 as “years of political victory which saw 
a Papuan leadership take strong direction. Two successive Papuan Na-
tional Congresses established the Presidium Dewan Papua (Papua Pre-
sidium Council) and, in turn, set two paths to territorial independence.” 
Mote continues:
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Following the fall of the New Order military regime … 100 
representatives of the Papuan nation travelled to Jakarta to 
make their aspirations clear in a peaceful, open, and demo-
cratic way to the new President of Indonesia, B. J. Habibie. The 
whole Papuan nation had united and cast off the ropes of fear 
that had entangled them for so long. From mountain to coast, 
from north and south, whether Protestant, Catholic or even 
Muslim, whether illiterate villager or educated city-dweller—
all united and shouted a single word: merdeka! or freedom.19 
Thus, a hundred Papuan leaders (sometimes referred to as Team 100) ad-
vanced a claim to self-determination for the Papuan people. They hoped 
this might start a process of positive change in Papua, one that would shift 
away from the nearly forty preceding years of conflict. After the fall of 
Suharto, the notion of “straightening” false history, a re-understanding 
of the events that have happened since the incorporation of Papua into 
Indonesia in the 1960s, gained prominence among Papuans. Papuan lead-
ers explicitly called for this truth-telling as part of their political activism. 
They also embarked on an “international political campaign to kick-start 
the independence struggle for the return and consolidation of basic rights 
of the Papuan people and nation.”20
Within the Special Autonomy Law of 2001, space was encoded or leg-
islated to ensure a process that would address Papuan calls for correcting 
history and truth-telling. In 2003, in response to a call from religious lead-
ers in Papua to help them promote peace, justice, and human rights, several 
faith-based organizations formed a network committed to supporting the 
campaign of Papuan religious leaders to make Papua a “land of peace.”21 
The group describes the initiative, which was established by leaders of the 
Catholic, Christian, Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist communities in Papua, 
as follows:
“Papua, Land of Peace” aims to establish a culture of peace. It 
builds communication ties between the different peoples and 
religions within Papua and between Papuans and the Indone-
sian Government. It intends to offer a free and just space, an 
arena for an open-ended discussion, and a frame for dialogue 
acceptable to all parties. “Papua, Land of Peace” recognizes 
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Papua’s memoria passionis: the remembrance of a history full 
of violence, neglect and broken promises against the Papuans. 
It believes that this history needs healing and recognition.22
Activists and leaders have also taken this agenda forward in various inter-
national forums, ranging from religious and civil-society groups who have 
dedicated their efforts to documenting violence, to calls for international 
human rights observers. The ULMWP recently called for the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group (MSG) and the Pacific Islands Forum to initiate human 
rights investigations in West Papua, and this has certainly gained traction 
among some members of the MSG. 
Yet so far, little to no progress has been made towards Papuan calls for 
historical “truth,” nor truth in response to acts of state violence that con-
tinue to occur. For example, human rights organizations continue to call 
for investigations into widespread patterns of violence but these calls have 
led to minimal, if any, response. It is worth noting that, broadly speaking, 
Indonesia has a very poor record of addressing historical human rights 
violations.23
In 2009 the Indonesian National Institute of Sciences (LIPI) released 
a report that outlined a “road map” for resolving conflict in Papua.24 The 
road map listed four pillars of Papua’s problems, including lack of recog-
nition of historical wrongs and injustices, and offered four recommended 
solutions. The road map has been a reference point for peace advocates and 
activists in Tanah Papua, in particular the Papua Peace Network (Jaringan 
Damai Papua), which has strong backing from church leaders in Papua. 
Calls for dialogue have been met with reticence under all previous Indone-
sian administrations. 
Under President Jokowi, there has so far not been any movement for-
ward on political dialogue, changing atmospheres of repression and abuse, 
or truth-telling. To some extent the government has acknowledged that vi-
olence occurs in Papua, and that there have been human rights violations, 
but it considers these violations to be a thing of the past. 
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Post-Violence Resolution in the Central Highlands:  
The Honelama and Tolikara Incidents
In this section we discuss the efforts at resolution and reconciliation that 
took place after two separate incidents of security-sector violence in the 
highlands. Our objective is to draw out some details on what current, local, 
and Papuan approaches to resolving state-perpetrated violence look like 
and to reflect on how they engage with truth, cultural values, and local and 
government leaders. We invite you to imagine how a truth and reconcilia-
tion process or commission might address a fifty-year history of incidents 
like these.
Honelama, Wamena, 6 June 2012
On 6 June 2012, while Jenny was in Wamena, Jayawijaya regency, in the 
central highlands, two soldiers from Battalion 756, speeding down a vil-
lage road in Honelama, struck and injured a child with their motorbike at 
about 10 am. The child was rushed to the hospital. His relatives, attending a 
funeral nearby, did not know the child’s exact conditions, and began fight-
ing with the soldiers. One soldier was stabbed and died on the roadside, 
while the other was injured and rushed to the hospital.25 Then, around 
12 pm, two truckloads of soldiers from the battalion attacked Honelama 
village, killing an Indigenous man and stabbing about a dozen people.26 
The village, including homes, buildings, and vehicles, was burned to the 
ground. People fled the area. 
Indigenous NGOs, led by the Central Highlands Legal Advocacy 
and Human Rights Network (Jaringan Advokasi Penegakan Hukum dan 
HAM Pegunungan Tengah Papua) immediately formed an investigative 
team and began documenting injuries, deaths, and loss of property.27 The 
NGOs involved were not specifically legal or political organizations, and 
included the Jayawijaya Women’s Voice Foundation, Yukemdi (the lead-
ing HIV NGO), and the Catholic Youth Association. The report contained 
details of the incident, photos of injuries and eyewitness testimony. It was 
prepared and disseminated quickly. When it was released, for example, the 
authors did not know whether the child hit by soldiers was alive or dead. 
According to the report, the soldiers not only attacked Honelama but then 
continued rioting down the main streets of town, shooting at buildings, 
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destroying the homes of both Papuans and non-Papuans, and burning 
vehicles.28 
On 12 June, a group of leaders and officials (pimpinan daerah)—in-
cluding the regent of Jayawijaya, the head of the local legislature (the 
DPRD) and other parliamentarians, the Jayawijaya representative from the 
Papua Peoples Assembly (Majelis Rakyat Papua, or MRP), several church 
and NGO leaders, and traditional leaders—met in Wamena. From the se-
curity side, there was the district military commander (Kodim), the head 
of the Jayawijaya police, and the commander of Battalion 756 (the unit to 
which the two soldiers belonged). Based on the available descriptions, the 
security representatives were all Indonesian, and the majority of the local 
government, NGO, and church representatives were Papuan. 
The group developed a joint statement, which they referred to as a 
“peace agreement” (kesepakatan damai), to resolve the incident. It con-
tained eight points (translated below):
1.  Their deepest concern and regret at the stabbing incident 
between TNI Battalion 756 Wimane Sili and the civilians, 
which caused loss of life and property. 
2.  All sides agreed to resolve the situation and safeguard 
security and order in the Jayawijaya region and through the 
central highlands by respecting the reconciliation process 
undertaken by the government.
3. The civilian and military perpetrators and the soldier should 
be investigated and processed according to the law.
4.  The circulation of alcoholic drinks by civilians and the 
security apparatus in Jayawijaya should be stopped to reduce 
criminal behaviour.
5.  The government will document all losses associated with the 
actions of 6 June 2012 and give compensation to the victims. 
6.  If a similar incident occurred again, the security apparatus 
is requested to take a persuasive approach [i.e., not a violent 
response].
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7.  If a similar incident were to occur again, the parties to the 
conflict should not take matters into their own hands nor 
use weapons.
8.  The community and members of the military and police are 
requested not to provoke one another regarding this incident 
in the days to come thereby prolonging the problem.
Representatives then signed the statement.29 
News reports also state that a traditional feast (bakar batu) was held in 
Honelama. It involved statements and impromptu speeches from the mil-
itary representatives as well as victims and villagers, and was mediated by 
church and traditional leaders. The victims requested that the perpetrators 
from Battalion 756 and the civilians who stabbed the deceased soldier be 
arrested and processed according to the law. They asked that the legal pro-
ceedings be conducted in a transparent manner so that the community at 
large could be informed. Lastly, they asked the government to compensate 
them for all of their losses pertaining to the incident.30 
Another media report indicates that Battalion 756 provided money to 
the victims to cover the cost of treating their injuries, and that this occurred 
at the bakar batu in Honelama.31 The Jawawijaya district commander ex-
pressed regret at the incident and for the injuries caused to civilians as well 
as the soldiers. The Battalion 756 commander expressed regret at the “emo-
tional and spontaneous” actions of his soldiers who took vengeance on the 
community, noting that regardless their reasons they would be sanctioned 
according to the law. Statements of regret were also made by church leaders 
and representatives from the local Nduga group. Interestingly, they assert-
ed that the civilian who killed the soldier was from Lanny Jaya and had fled 
into Honelama, causing the residents of the latter to bear the brunt of the 
violence. They asked that the Lanny Jaya community apologize to the TNI 
and the people of Wamena. 
News reports suggest that the meeting also provided an opportunity 
to review the facts of what occurred and to correct misinformation. For 
example, it had been rumoured that the military shot a civilian, and that 
the regent had confirmed or asserted this information. At the meeting, it 
was clarified that the regent had not stated this and that the military had 
not shot any civilians. 
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Beyond this, however, the investigative team also heard that soldiers 
were claiming that they attacked civilians because a weapon had been sto-
len from the injured soldiers. The investigative team found no evidence 
that villagers had stolen a weapon, strongly opposed this view, and argued 
that this was being used to justify what had occurred. The team thus de-
manded that the “TNI Commander examine the actions of the soldiers 
and clarify again what really happened.”32
The first part of this particular truth and reconciliation process was a 
community-led investigation that took place very early on in the incident. 
Their efforts potentially thwarted an attempt by the military to explain 
their actions by alleging that people had stolen a weapon. Data and truth 
were clearly an important part of this agenda. The investigators represent-
ed highly respected locals—albeit all men—with extensive community 
networks and experience mediating between grassroots society and gov-
ernment institutions. Political leaders then engaged in a formal reconcili-
ation meeting that was also attended by church and community leaders to 
devise the joint statement on the incident. It contains various statements 
of regrets from both sides and it criticizes the actions of both the civilians 
who fought with the soldiers and the soldiers who took vengeance. It con-
tains various broader statements related to conditions that might have led 
to this sort of violence and which could prevent something similar from 
happening again. It notes the need for compensation and calls for a de-es-
calation of tensions and the eschewal of any further violence. 
Then, a village-level reconciliation, mediated by church and tradition-
al leaders, focused on the military and the local victims and villagers. It 
centred on a traditional bakar batu feast and some forms of compensa-
tion were paid, or at least promised. Bakar batu is widely recognized as an 
important Indigenous custom in the highlands. Guests bring pigs, sweet 
potatoes, and greens, and this is traditionally organized depending on the 
relationships between the hosts and the guests. The food is covered in ba-
nana palms and steamed slowly under hot rocks. When it is opened the 
food is distributed by the hosts to the guests, who are usually sitting on 
the ground, grouped according to different kinship relations and families. 
Men sit and eat separately from women and most of the children. 
Historically, bakar batu was the culmination of marriage and funeral 
ceremonies through which large-scale exchanges of pigs occurred among 
clans. Nowadays bakar batu remains central at funerals and weddings but 
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is also common at holiday celebrations, birthdays, and other community 
occasions, such as church openings, political gatherings, or the inaugura-
tion of an official. It is mainly practiced among Indigenous locals, though 
large-scale celebrations (church events or inaugurations) might attract 
non-Papuans. Given that it is typically a meal of pork, which the majority 
of non-Papuans (who are Muslim) do not eat, non-Papuans’ participation 
in bakar batu is often limited. Bakar batu is normally organized on egal-
itarian principles, and reflects the view that sitting and eating together 
generates and affirms social bonds. When bakar batu needs to cater for 
officials and non-Papuans, then sitting on the ground is not considered 
an option, and chairs and tables are provided. The atmosphere is distinct-
ly less egalitarian, much more formal, and potentially awkward as people 
who do not normally mix or interact (and who are probably not relatives 
or neighbours) are brought together. It is unclear from the various reports 
how, exactly, the bakar batu took place in Honelama, whether all sides sat 
and ate together. But it is important to keep in mind when thinking about 
this example of reconciliation just how out of the ordinary close interac-
tion between Indigenous locals and Indonesian security personnel is in 
Wamena, other than potentially negative interactions like surveillance or 
questioning. Most locals would not have had military officials visit and 
speak publicly in their village, let alone share in bakar batu.
During the ceremony, different groups made statements of regret and 
impact. Those that were ostensibly concerned with regret contained im-
portant, less-conciliatory subtexts, such as the commander’s view that the 
soldiers’ “spontaneous” violence was attributable to emotion rather than 
organized or condoned by their superiors, or the Nduga group’s emphasis 
on the culpability of the people of Lanny Jaya. This assessment reflects ten-
sions between groups from different parts of the central highlands that go 
beyond the incident. 
The Honelama reconciliation process can be said to broadly repre-
sent typical reconciliation efforts after state violence in the highlands and 
perhaps beyond. There is a strong formal and institutional dimension, in-
cluding the production of a statement for popular consumption, and also a 
more local or cultural dimension in the use of the bakar batu and reference 
to compensation. At both levels Indigenous representatives, ranging from 
elite political actors like the regent to more community-based NGO and 
customary figures, were main leaders. 
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Karubaga, Tolikara, 16 July 2015
On 16 July 2015, in the town of Karubaga—located in another part of the 
highlands—a slightly more complex scenario unfolded. A large gathering 
of Christians from the Evangelical Church of Indonesia (Gereja Injili di 
Indonesia, or GIDI), many from outside the area, were participating in a 
religious camp that coincided with the Muslim holiday of Ramadan. GIDI 
leaders had advised the authorities, including military and police, of their 
gathering, and requested that the mosque not use its loudspeaker for the 
call to prayers during the event.33 Early reports said that, while the po-
lice had agreed to this request, this message was not received or was not 
passed onto the imam. However, later investigations suggest that the situ-
ation was more complicated, in part because the GIDI activities had been 
rescheduled after the request was agreed to.34 There may have been poor 
communication about the nature and the timing of the request. When the 
call to prayer came over the loudspeaker, a group of youth from the reli-
gious gathering went to the military command post, where the soldiers 
and police were themselves conducting their morning prayers, to ask why 
the loudspeaker was being used. Some reports say that the youths were 
throwing rocks and shouting, “Disperse.” A soldier fired into the air and 
then others opened fire on the crowd. A Papuan youth, fifteen-year-old 
Edi Wanimbo, was killed and ten people suffered gunshot wounds. A riot 
ensued in which a number of shops were set alight by Papuans. The fire 
spread to the nearby mosque, which was damaged. 
Reports travelled around Indonesia that Papuans had attacked a 
mosque and devotees during Idul Fitri prayers. These reports were soon 
(ostensibly) accompanied by a copy of a letter from the local GIDI church 
leader requesting that a number of restrictions be placed on local Muslims, 
including the banning of the call to prayer and wearing of the head scarf. 
Reports circulated that Tolikara regency had passed a local law restricting 
the activities of non-GIDI denominations and religions, but this was dis-
covered to be false. Such a law had been proposed by the regent but had not 
gained approval from the governor, the district parliament, or the national 
Ministry of Home Affairs.35 
The speed at which these unverified reports spread over the Internet 
was incredible. News of the incident incited outrage, especially among In-
donesian Muslims then celebrating the end of Ramadan. According to an 
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analysis from researchers at the Centre for Cross Cultural and Religious 
Studies at Gadjah Mada University in Java, a number of media reports ex-
aggerated (menggoreng, literally “fried”) the incident.36 Victor Mambor, a 
Papuan journalist, later commented that within about two hours the police 
had already issued a chronology of events, largely based on information 
from text messages, and without talking to any of the eyewitnesses.37 The 
violence was described as an attack on Muslims by intolerant, “crazed” 
(amuk) Papuans.38 The news quickly reached Jakarta, and even President 
Jokowi was asked to comment and take action against the Papuans. A 
panel of Jakarta-based church leaders (including GIDI) was convened to 
comment on television. To combat these representations, church and other 
Papuan leaders, such as Catholic priest and peace advocate Dr. Neles Te-
bay, soon weighed in, arguing that Muslims and Christians had lived in 
peace in Karubaga for the past few decades and that there had never been 
tension or violence. They argued against labelling the incident a religious 
conflict and requested that outsiders end their provocative statements. 
Popular opinion on social media further asserted that the matter should 
be left to locals in Papua to resolve according to their existing relationships 
and knowledge of the context.39
In response, on 24 July, the regent formed a Reconciliation Team (Tim 
Pemulihan, though later news reports also used the term rekonsiliasi40) 
comprised of Muslim and GIDI church leaders, local Indigenous leaders, 
government representatives, and members of the police and military. The 
team was to facilitate the distribution of donations that were coming in for 
those who lost property as well as those who were in hospital with gun-
shot wounds, to provide psychological support, and to mediate between 
Christian and Muslim congregations so as to ensure that the atmosphere 
remained peaceful.41 On 29 July, high-level representatives from the reli-
gious groups issued a joint statement in Jayapura, the provincial capital, by 
which they conveyed their understanding of the incident (it was character-
ized a miscommunication, not a religious conflict), mutual apologies, and 
commitments to rebuilding.42 
Prior to this, a team from the National Human Rights Commission 
also conducted investigations and noted four separate human rights viola-
tions related to the case, both on the part of local authorities, who tried to 
restrict others’ religious practices, and on the part of military and police, 
who shot at the crowd.43 
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A number of Papuans were also arrested, and there were calls from the 
local religious leaders to settle the matter outside the formal legal system 
and according to custom. The police, however, insisted that the accused be 
dealt with legally. Two men were ultimately imprisoned for two months. 
In early August, the regent described a number of efforts underway 
to aid with reconciliation.44 This included shows of solidarity and support 
towards Muslims by the regent and other high-level political officials, dis-
bursement of funds to rebuild the shops and the mosque, a community 
festival, and the establishment of a number of new military checkpoints 
in town. Thus, even though the regent had seemingly promoted religious 
intolerance (including of non-GIDI Christian denominations), he quick-
ly backed away from this perspective for the sake of reconciliation when 
pressed by higher authorities.
There are some parallels here with the resolution arrived at in the 
Honelama incident, such as the quick formation of a formal group com-
prised of government, community, and religious leaders, the emphasis on 
rebuilding, de-escalation, apologies without blame, and yet also simulta-
neous efforts to seek facts and develop a balanced account of the events. It 
appears, however, that there was no traditional feast or compensation paid, 
as occurred in Honelama. There was no explicit focus on a village-level 
ceremony since the violence took place in the centre of the small town. 
While Papuans and human rights defenders were critical of the police and 
military response, the police and military offered no regrets or apologies, 
and clearly felt that Papuans were the culprits. Thus, what actually might 
be read as a military-civilian incident was construed as a Muslim-Chris-
tian conflict, notwithstanding the fact that some of the Muslims who were 
praying, and even some who were shooting, were in fact soldiers. 
The above examples give some sense of the broad patterns and para-
metres of post-violence reconciliation in the highlands. These examples 
focus on the immediate aftermath, which is significant because, given the 
underlying tensions between Papuans and Indonesians and the high level 
of militarization in the area, events like these could easily trigger wide-
spread violence. The longer-term view seems to be that incidents continue 
to happen, and military and police violence continues, if not necessarily in 
Karubaga or Wamena specifically. Thus these measures secure a modicum 
of peace for the time being. It is difficult to say how far these approaches 
to reconciliation address violence that could be construed as “religious” or 
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ethnic, because such conflict is rare (and it remains unclear to what extent 
Papuans’ actions in Karubaga were directed towards Muslims per se or 
towards soldiers and police). 
The cases above press us to question what “Papuan” or “local” ap-
proaches look like while also noting the strong role played by politicians 
and military/state agendas that were asserted in both cases. Papuans clear-
ly participated, and took leading roles in some aspects of these reconcil-
iation approaches, but many other Papuans were highly unsatisfied with 
the sort of truth and reconciliation that was demonstrated through the 
ensuing community performances. There are different degrees and mean-
ings of participation, and ownership is a different matter altogether. None 
of the broader questions about the actions of police and military or ethnic 
tensions have since been seriously addressed, and a cynical view may hold 
that reconciliation was swiftly performed to shut down and exclude an 
expanding chorus of critical voices demanding real discussions, answers, 
and responses.
Truth and Place: Integrating Ecological and Cultural 
Perspectives into Reconciliation
If the above cases give a sense of the standard reactions to violations that 
occur in local contexts (rather than violation writ large, as in the entire 
political conflict), this section focuses on asking what might be possible, 
and what else should be considered. 
When we talk about a human rights focus and the individual focus 
within truth and reconciliation, we are positing relationships with people 
and places as they are understood in Western, Euro-American legal and 
civil ideas. Thus it is important to ask how other people, and other com-
munities in other parts of the world, understand themselves. When we talk 
about ethnic Papuans, we are talking about people who would identify as 
Indigenous peoples. There are some three hundred distinct languages and 
communities within just the western part of the island. This is a region, 
then, known for its remarkable biological, cultural, and ethnic diversity. 
Culture and heritage are significant in everyday life and as identity markers, 
and would need to be reflected in approaches to truth and reconciliation. 
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In Tanah Papua, societies, languages, and ways of being and seeing 
reflect inter-connected relationships among people and place. These un-
derstandings foster identities that may challenge limited notions of “indi-
vidual rights” commonly addressed through truth and reconciliation pro-
cesses, even as many Papuans are also educated and versed in other notions 
of rights and may be dedicated to inherited legal traditions. Honouring 
the place-based perspectives of Indigenous Papuans, and the integrity of 
relationships with the natural environment, would require diving deeply 
into local world views and experiences. Looking at place-based aspects of 
Papuan communities, particularly the ones that are living in proximity to 
forests, would perhaps present novel considerations for meaningful truth 
and reconciliation.
To underline this point, consider the words of Neles Tebay: 
The forest, for indigenous Papuans from all tribes, has 
multi-dimensional meanings … it is first and foremost a 
member of the community. The Papuan community is com-
posed not only of living people, but also the deceased, spirits, 
plants, animals, and the whole of nature. That’s why commu-
nity, both as a tribe and a community within a tribe, always 
has its own forest with a clearly defined boundary. Culturally 
speaking, a Papuan can never be separated from the forest. It 
would be a mistake if the Papuan forest was seen as an isolat-
ed thing from the Papuans themselves because the forest and 
the people form one community. The deeper sense of forest 
is expressed in the Papuan saying “hutan adalah mama” (the 
forest is our mother). The forest is respected as a mother who 
tirelessly cares for, protects and sustains all of the members of 
the community, including the animals. Papuans cannot imag-
ine life without the forest; emphasizing the deeper meaning of 
forests they say … “our forests, our lives.”45
Similarly, one of the Papuan communities where we have recently worked 
lies on the north coast of West Papua province’s Bird’s Head region. There, 
the Mpur people have a saying: “nek te eyen” (the land is our mother).46 
When Mpur people say that their land is their mother or that their lives 
and souls are one with the forests, what they mean is rooted in a way of 
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seeing and being in which “the quality of intimate relations with non-hu-
man and human components of the environment is one and the same.”47 
There would seem to be a sense of self and a sense of identity that extends 
beyond their own “individual” body to include the agency of other com-
munity members and the living environment around them. Therefore, in 
thinking about the impact of resource extraction and the exploitation of 
people and environment that comes with development that is imposed or 
conducted in conditions of fear, it is important to consider the perspectives 
on identity, agency, and community held by those who have been violated. 
These kinds of expressions of coupling between people and place, and the 
integral meanings which co-arise among them, indicate novel understand-
ings of identity. Individuals are in relationship with community and the 
more-than-human cohabitants of a place in a holistic way. 
Papuan civil-society colleagues emphasize that human rights, devel-
opment, and environmental issues are integrated and cannot be separated. 
From working in these realms of ecological, social justice, and community 
development, it seems to us that development, human rights, and cultur-
al values and experiences cannot be separated. The need to grapple with 
these interconnections forces us to try to extend the concept of truth and 
reconciliation and its processes.
Extending the Foundations of Truth and Reconciliation  
in Tanah Papua
It seems that reconciliation depends first on what sort of truth comes out 
and how it is facilitated, and what understandings underpin the notion of 
“truth”; similarly, who or what was reconciled in Honelama and Karubaga, 
and what has been silenced. What would be the scale at which a future 
process would operate: village or state? Local or national? 
Reconciliation requires modes that capture the complexities of Tanah 
Papua. We have focused on violence and the violation of identity and place 
that often occurs in contexts of coercive resource development. But there 
are many more angles and scales to truth and reconciliation in Tanah Pap-
ua that need investigation and consideration. The daily social challenges 
of ethnic relations, racialized histories, and the day-to-day discrimination 
will need to be transcended in any meaningful truth and reconciliation 
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process.48 This will not be easy in a country that is reticent to talk about 
race and racism. In order to get to a place of truth, the Indonesian govern-
ment—and Indonesian society at large—has to acknowledge wrongdoing. 
It has to break the pattern of denial, and external actors, like companies 
and development agencies, need to stop facilitating denials in the name of 
avoiding political sensitivities.49 This is not possible as long as truth and 
reconciliation in Tanah Papua depends on the will or ability of any par-
ticular political leader, who is constrained by conservative and growing 
neo-nationalist elements.50
Another layer of complexity concerns what consensus exists, or might 
be built, among people in Papua and beyond, given asymmetries of power, 
alliances, and political entanglements.51 These entanglements, built over 
the past several decades, blur the lines between victims and perpetrators, 
and reflect multiple layers and modalities of exclusion. Religious leaders, 
community leaders, Indigenous leaders, women, men, ethnic and religious 
minorities, businessmen and women, government, local elite, non-elite, 
poor, rich, Javanese, Papuan: all have their own politics, orientations, and 
perspectives. What are the common denominators and where are the cen-
tres of gravity that can serve as the meeting place for this diversity and the 
hierarchies within it? On this note we find that although a Papuan elite is 
certainly emerging, Papuan leaders have also demonstrated their ability to 
build consensus and, to a large degree, unity, despite decades of fractious 
governance and the current flash flood of cash and power. In our various 
activities and relationships with civil-society organizations in Tanah Pap-
ua, we have consistently found the values of community-building, a sense 
of justice and ethical practice, and a sustained critique of inequality in all 
of its local and distant guises. Local experience thus bodes well for an in-
clusive and meaningful truth and reconciliation process.
Approaches to truth and reconciliation in Tanah Papua would need 
to consider how to capture and resolve violations of selves (individuals, 
rights) as well as lived experiences that include connections to the natural 
world. Such efforts would also need to account for multiple and diverse 
perspectives. “Truth” itself would have to be seen as somewhat dynamic, 
given the potential diversity of experiences and priorities. A fact-finding 
mission or investigative report, while useful for certain purposes, would 
also not seem fit to reflect Indigenous understandings. Flexibility and 
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creativity of expression, along with a degree of experimentation, would 
be important.
If we posit a truth and reconciliation process as a modality for pos-
itive social change in Papua, and for individual and collective healing, 
how do we do that in a way that engages local understandings, needs, and 
perspectives? How can efforts to do so integrate rather than flatten out all 
of the complex dynamics and layers? What would a holistic process look 
like that reconciles the whole spectrum of abuse and violence experienced 
by individuals and communities across Tanah Papua? Is a more home-
grown solution possible? In seeking answers to these questions from a 
Papuan starting place, perhaps we shed light on global questions of truth 
and reconciliation.
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